University of Baltimore Law Forum
Volume 15
Number 1 Fall, 1984

Article 9

1984

Religion on Trial: George v. International Society of
Krishna Consciousness
Wilbert Lee Taylor

Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarworks.law.ubalt.edu/lf
Part of the Religion Law Commons
Recommended Citation
Taylor, Wilbert Lee (1984) "Religion on Trial: George v. International Society of Krishna Consciousness," University of Baltimore Law
Forum: Vol. 15 : No. 1 , Article 9.
Available at: http://scholarworks.law.ubalt.edu/lf/vol15/iss1/9

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by ScholarWorks@University of Baltimore School of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in
University of Baltimore Law Forum by an authorized editor of ScholarWorks@University of Baltimore School of Law. For more information, please
contact snolan@ubalt.edu.

George v. International Sod

O

n June 17, 1983, a California
superior court jury returned a
verdict against a group of Hare
Krishna devotees and found in favor of a
former sect disciple and her mother,
awarding the plaintiffs an amount over
$32 million in damages. I Robin George,
the co,plaintiff, was fourteen years old
in 1974 when she ran away from home
to join a Laguna Beach, California
Krishna Temple. Thereafter Miss George
was shuffled among temples in Louisana,
New York and Canada, allegedly to pre'
vent her parents from learning of her
whereabouts. Miss George's father suf,
fered a fatal stroke one year after the un,
successful attempts to locate her. Sub,
sequently, Miss George recanted the
Krishna faith and joined by her mother,
instituted suit against the various
temples which had harbored her and, in
particular, against the leaders of the
Laguna Beach and New Orleans temples.
The jury awarded damages upon causes
of action that alleged false imprison,
ment, intentional infliction of emotional
distress, wrongful death, and libel,2
The decision is significant for two rea,
sons: first, the award easily surpassed the
previous record California verdict against
a religious organization (a $1.7 million
judgment in 1981 against Synanon,3
another unpopular alternative religious
society); second, it provides an oppor,
tunity to analyze various state,protected
individual interests, reflected in the
causes of action, against the interests
protected under the First Amendment
Clauses. 4 Those clauses, functioning
together,S have been interpreted as pro,
tecting the individual exercise of free,
dom of religion from undue interference,
preference or establishment of a parti,
cular set of religious beliefs to the exclu,
sion of less popular beliefs,6 such as the
Krishna sect holds. 7 It is the thesis of this
article that extreme punitive awards, as
in the George case, are a form of punish,
ment for religious beliefs and religiously,
motivated behavior, if left intact after
judicial review. Therefore, actions in,
volving a recanting plaintiff who dis,
avows his consent should be disfavored
as infringing upon the constitutional
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rights of a religious society defendant.
This article will examine the history of
the Religion Clauses and their applica,
tion to cases involving alternative reli,
gions. It will include an examination of
the specific causes of action upon which
the George verdict rested, and concludes
that excessive punitive damage awards
are a form of jury bias against unpopular
religious beliefs in violation of the First
Amendment Religion Clauses.
In the period preceding 1791, in
Europe, the norm was a system of civil
government encompassing a sanctioned
set of religious principles. The establish,
ment of a religion was typified by the de,
signation of a state church, with rights
and privileges arrogated to the church
and its members. These attributes in'
cluded: 1) official recognition and pro,
tection by the sovereign; 2) the right to
compel religious orthodoxy under threat
of fine or imprisonment; 3) the ability to
finance the church through taxes upon
the general community; 4) the sole ability
to conduct public worship; and 5) the
sole ability to perform valid marriages,
burials and other solemn rites.8
While it might have been surmised
that the American colonial response to
religious repression of dissidents in
Europe would have been a greater show,
ing of religious tolerance, prior to the
Bill of Rights, the initial response of the
colonies was to establish their own
favored religions and to civilly suppress
dissenters as heretics. 9 The earliest state
constitutional safeguards of civil and
political rights from religious discrim,
ination were enacted in 1776, fifteen
years prior to the ratification of the First
Amendment. 10
A process of disestablishment, aimed
at eliminating the rights and privileges of
establishment (as earlier enumerated), II
and progress toward religious freedom
was gradual. 12 For example, in 1776,
Virginia was the first state to enact a
guarantee against religious discrimi,
nation; 13 however, its dissenting sects
were still struggling for equality before
the law as late as 1785. 14 It was not until
1798 that all the laws preventing self,
regulation of dissenting religious societies
in that state were repealed and state'
granted lands to the established church
were confiscated. IS Virginia's experience
of maintaining incidences of an estab,

lished religion was not unique among
the states. 16 The available evidence points
to the conclusion that most states were
content with their own internal efforts at
disestablishment and primarily amended
the Constitution by adding the Religion
Clauses in order to preempt the federal
government from establishing a church
of its own.17
After ratification of the First Amend,
ment Religion Clauses, the states con,
tinued disestablishment at their deliber,
ate pace and early Supreme Court de,
cis ions reflected the Court's attitude
that the right of free exercise and the
prohibition against establishment were
inapplicable to state practices. 18 A series
of decisions, however, resulted in a
gradual disintegration of this attitude.
The first of such decisions was the ratifi,
cation of the Fourteenth Amendment in
1868. 19 Then, in 1878, the Supreme
Court decided Reynolds v. U.S. 20 which
involved a Mormon who appealed his
conviction under a Congressional statute
outlawing bigamy in t~rritories under
federal control. In affirming the convic,
tion, the Court considered the history of
the First Amendment and decided that
its purpose was to build "a wall of separ,
arion between church and State."21 Fur,
ther, the Court advanced a dichotomy
between religious beliefs and religiously,
motivated actions-the First Amend,
ment was meant to deprive Congress of
all power to legislate regarding the for,
mer, in which legislation would consti,
tute an establishment, but not the latter
when such legislation legitimately sought
to preserve secular duties and good pub,
lie order,zz Applying that dichotomy to
the situation before it, the Reynolds Court
reasoned that marriage was a relationship
created and protected by civil authority;
therefore, subject to legitimate civil
regulation in the public interest. 23 Thus,
the Court enunciated standards for First
Amendment challenges based upon aI,
leged violations of the establishment
prohibition24 and the protected free
exercise right, and established a balanc,
ing test whereby individual actions taken
in pursuance of the free exercise right
would be weighed against legitimate
governmental action taken in the public
interest. Finally, the attitude of inappli,
cability of the Religion Clauses to the
states was reversed in the Supreme Court
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decision of Cantwell v. Connecticut. 25 In
this landmark decision, the Supreme
Court applied the Fourteenth Amend~
ment so as to incorporate the First
Amendment's religion protections as
against the states.
Cantwell, a Jehovah's Witness who
was convicted of inciting a breach of the
peace, had presented no clear and pre~
sent threat to public peace;26 however
his street~corner ministering had included
a bitter attack upon other organized reli~
gions, particularly Roman Catholicism.
On that basis the Court, applying the
balancing test employed in Reynolds, re~
versed the conviction, holding that upon
the facts of the case, the colorable public

interest did not outweigh Cantwell's
protected free exercise interest.
The Supreme Court has refined its
approach to challenges to governmental
action based upon violations of protected
Religion Clauses rights since the 1940
Cantwell decision. The need for further
refinement is evident, however, when
one examines the increasing litigation
regarding alternative religious societies.
It has been held that a religion does not
have to envision a supreme being to be
entitled to First Amendment protec~
tion. 27 Despite this constitutional pro~
tection, alternative religious societies are
being forced to defend suits initiated by

former devotees alleging tortious con~
duct suffered at the defendant church's
hands. The results thus far have been
mixed-federal claims against the
churches have failed primarily because
of jurisdictional or evidentiary short~
comings; however, state~based tort
claims have survived preliminary mo~
tions. 28 Issues of consent of a non~adult
and of prejudice or bias against an un~
popular alternative. religion have not been
addressed directly,29 although the trend
in litigation involving alternative religions
appears to be against these unpopular
organizations,30 as is manifested in George
v.ISKC.
Factual determinations are crucial in
Fall, 1984/The Law Forum-I 7

determining whether a verdict implicat~
ing a Religion Clauses violation, such as
in the George case,31 will withstand the
scrutiny of judicial review.32 The thres~
hold factual determination appears to be
that of consent of the purported tort vic~
tim, for a valid consent33 would form an
absolute defense to the claims upon
which such a verdict rested. 34
While the co~plaintiff, Robin George,
was approximately fourteen~years~old at
the time she ran away from home and
joined a Krishna temple, the mere fact of
infancy should not foreclose the consent
issue automatically.35 The question be~
comes one of the emancipated status of
the minor child,36 for state law generally
holds that, as between parent and child,
such emancipated status leaves the
minor unbenefitted by the parental obli~
gation of support for care, maintenance

To attempt to guage

the sincerity of an
individual plaintiff's
religious position
would violate the free
exercise and
establishment rights
of a religious society.

and necessaries and consequently un~
burdened by the need for parental con~
sent.37 Furthermore, to determine eman~
cipation of unmarried minor children38
facts and circumstances are considered,39
including the intention of the parents,40
although it is recognized that emancipa~
tion may result despite the parents' in~
tentions. 41 California, the George case
jurisdiction, has a law against emancipa~
tion based solely upon the actions of the
child;42 however, the state's appellate
courts have ruled this statute to be
merely presumptive. 43 There are strong
indications that the parents in George did
not acquiesce in their daughter's run~
ning away from home and thus had no
intention of emancipating her by impli~
cation. 44 This, however, begs the larger
constitutional issues of whether a four~
teen~year~old child may be competent to
IS-The Law Forum/Fall, 1984

formulate a religious consent sufficient
to effect a partial emancipation for that
purpose ,45 and whether the Religion
Clause would protect, the child's rights,
as well as the religious society's rights
arising from its reasonable belief of the
child's competence to consent. 46
Objective determinations based upon
empirical studies of capacity to formu~
late religious consent show that upon
reaching the mental age of fourteen, a
child does have such capacity47 and in~
deed reaches the age of greatest religious
potentiality48 during an adolescence
roughly stretching from ages twelve to
sixteen. 49 To go beyond this objective
determination of religious capacity,
however, and to attempt to gauge the
sincerity of an individual plaintiff's reli~
gious position would violate the free
exercise and establishment rights of a
religious society. In U.S. v. Ballard,50 the
Supreme Court held that absent an im~
posing and legitimate threat to society,
the individual mode of expression and
the motivation of joiners of a religious
group are not subject to judicial deter~
mination. 51 Consequently, practices such
as relocating devotees from coast to coast
and characterizing a devotee's parents as
ttmeat~eating demons"52 without more,
would be protected indoctrination.
The state causes of action in George
were false imprisonment, intentional in~
fliction of emotional distress, wrongful
death, and libel. The largest single mone~
tary award was $1.5 million in compen~
satory and $15 million in punitive dam~
ages to the co~plaintiff, Robin George,
for false imprisonment. 53 The elements
of the tort of false imprisonment are a
nonconsensual, intentional54 confine~
ment of a person without lawful privilege
for an appreciable length of time. 55 Three
elements of the action should be suspect
in relation to a bona fide religious society
such as the Krishnas: consent, intent and
privilege.56 Absent a statutory presump~
tion, a civil plaintiff has a heavy burden
of proving l~ck of consent57 to an exer~
cise of the right of conscience in matters
of personal faith.58 Although the precise
issues of plaintiff's lack of consent and
possible prejudice against a defendant
alternative religious society have not
been reached by an appellate court,59 it
has been held that the consent of a four~
teen~year~old minor is relevant to a pro~
secution for that minor's alleged false
imprisonment60 and, further, that the
good faith, motive and intent of the de~
fendant should affect liability61 as well as
the measure of damages, particularly
punitive damages. 62

Intentional infliction of emotional
distress results from the unprivileged
outrageous conduct of the defendant
who, with intention to cause severe
emotional distress, actually and proxi~
mately causes such harm to the plain~
tiff.63 Severe emotional distress is de~
fined as distress so substantial that no
reasonable person in a civilized society
should be expected to endure it. 64 There
is no fixed or absolute standard by
which to compute the monetary value of
the claimed emotional distress, and re~
covery by one person for the severe
emotional distress suffered by another
has been allowed. 65 Under this cause of
action, co~plaintiff Robin George was
awarded $250,000 and her mother was
awarded $1.5 million in compensatory
damages,66 plus $12.25 million in puni~
tive damages was awarded to the pair. 67

The state acts
unconstitutionally
when it allows a
hostile public to inflict
crippling punishment
upon constitutionally
protected, though
admittedly unpopular,
religious beliefs.

However, the elements of consent, privi~
lege and intent should be presumed
against the plaintiff, and a favorable jury
verdict thereon should be suspect where
a competent plaintiff recants a defen~
dant religious society. 6B A further trouble~
some element of the offense would be
the necessity of outrageous conduct by
the defendant; here again, the Religion
Clauses would seem to allow great lati~
tude in unorthodox behavior by a de~
fendant religious institution before find~
ing malicious intent to engage in out~
rageous conduct. 69
Wrongful death actions, unknown at
common law,70 are regulated in each
state. 71 Co~plaintiff Robin George was
awarded $75,000 72 and her mother
received nothing for the wrongful death
of Mr. George, who died of a stroke
approximately one year after an unsuc~

cessful search for his daughter. 73 Ques~
tions of direct and proximate causality
are raised upon the apparent facts of the
case, although the facts are not known
completely. The relatively modest award
undoubtedly is a reflection of the fact
that California only allows punitive
damages in wrongful death actions
under limited circumstances 74 absent
from this case. The analysis regarding
consent, privilege and intent75 would be
equally valid with respect to a wrongful
death action. 76
A cause of action in libel requires an
unprivileged, false and malicious publi~
cation whereby a plaintiff is exposed to
public scorn, hatred, contempt, or
ridicule. 77 Although the details of the
alleged publication by the Krishnas
against the plaintiffs, Robin George and
her mother, are not known, 78 the
elements of privilege by consent and
intent79 would have to favor a protected
religious society over a recanting
plaintiff as religious freedom is within
the scope of the constitutional protec~
tions. Similarly, the offending publica~
tion would have to be removed from
religious opinion to lose the protection
of first amendment free speech.80
Plaintiff daughter was awarded $2,500
and her mother $10,000 in compensa~
tory damages for the libel, in addition to
sharing $2 million in punitive damages,81
a punitive award so excessive when
compared to the compensatory award as
to suggest jury bias. 82
The punitive damages in the George
case exceeded $29 million of a $32
million total award;83 thus, it is proper
to inquire whether the jury is attempting
to punish the religious society for its
unpopular beliefs. Not only are first
amendment religious rights as incor~
porated into the due process concept
involved, but also the award implicates
fourteenth amendment equal protection
rights,84 with judicial enforcement and
review of jury actions providing the
necessary state action to initiate a
consitutional claim. 85 State law requires
a reasonable relationship between actual
and punitive damages,86 even though no
fixed ratio exists.87 All relevant factors
are to be weighed in determining the
amount of punitive damages,88 and a
disproportionate ratio of damages raises
a presumption of prejudice or passion. 89
Favored by such a damage presumption,
an unpopular religious society, such as
the Krishnas, should appeal an inordinate
punitive award; to fail to do so would
allow public bias to have its intended
chilling effect upon the constitutional
rights of the minority.

The Religion Clauses face another
turning point in their interpretation and
application with the increasing contro~
versy surrounding new alternative reli~
gions, most of which are viewed with
suspicion, contempt and hostility. In
some cases, where the colorable religion
has proven to be a dangerous cult, the
suspicion and hostility of society have
proven to be natural defensive reactions
to a palpable evil. Nevertheless, the
society's instinct's are not unerring, and
our constitutional rights provide the
most effective safeguards against the
tyranny of the majority: The secular
interests of the state in the well~being of
minor children are not challenged nor
are the constitutionally protected reli~
gious interests of competent persons
who opt for belief in an alternative
religion. It is in the balancing of these

All relevant factors are
to be weighed in
determining the
amount of punitive
damages, and a
disproportionate ratio
of damages raises a
presumption of
prejudice or passion.

substantial interests when they conflict
that the courts are called upon to insure
that neither interest is disregarded
totally. The state court acts within the
realm of reasonableness perhaps, when
it draws the line of permissible religiously~
motivated behavior at harboring a
minor child of questionable competence
from his parents, even where there is a
good faith belief in the competent
consent of the child; the state acts
unconstitutionally, however, when it
allows a hostile public to inflict crippling
punishment upon constitutionally~pro~
tected, though admittedly unpopular
religious beliefs. W

Hi

I\>ople Helping People
The United Way

Notes
1 Baltimore Sun, June 19, 1983, at A3, col. I
[Hereinafter referred to in the text as

George].
[d., generally.
3 [d., at col. 2-3.
4 U.S. Const. Amend. I, cl. I & 2 provide
that: "Congress shall make no law
respecting an establishment of religion, or
prohibiting the free exercise thereof.. ...
5 See A. Stokes & L. Pfeffer, Church and
State in the United States, 93, (Rev. onevol. ed., 1964), (All of the First Amend.
clauses are interrelated and important to
religious freedom), [hereinafter cited as
Stokes]; J. Nowak, R. Rotunda & J.
Young, Constitutional Law, 849, (1978 &
Supp. 1982) [hereinafter cited as Nowak].
6 Cantwell v. Connecticutt, 310 U.S. 296
(1940); Everson v. Board of Education, 330
U.S. I (1947).
7 Local alternative religion spokespersons
have estimated that the full-time and parttime membership of the Unification
Church in Baltimore numbers less than
seventy persons, while the approximate
30,OOO-strong Hindu community of the
Washington/Baltimore area forms the
basis of support for the local Societies for
Krishna Consciousness. State Line television broadcast, Religion or Cult?, Md.
Center for Pub. Broadcasting, Nov. 13,
1983. It should be noted that actual
membership in the Krishna sect in this
area is certainly a rather small percentage
of the larger Hindu community.
8 C. Antieau, A. Downey & E. Roberts,
FREEDOM FROM FEDERAL ESTABLISHMENT
1-2 (1964) [hereinafter cited as Downey];
CONSTITUTIONAL PROBLEMS IN CHURCHSTATE RELATIONS 4-5 nn. 22 & 23 (L. Levy
ed. 1971) [hereinafter cited as Levy]; W.
Torpey, JUDICIAL DOCTRINES OF RELIGIOUS
RIGHTS IN AMERICA 8-9 (1948) [hereinafter
cited as Torpey].
9 See, e.g., C. Antieau, P. Carroll & T.
Burke, RELIGION UNDER THE STATE
CONSTITUTION 100 (1965) [hereinafter
cited as Antieau]; Torpey, supra note 16,
at 4, 9: Downey, supra note 18 at 1-29,204.
10 Antieau, supra note 9, at 10. (N.J. given
the dubious honor); Cf., text accompanying notes 14 & 15 infra.
11 Downey, supra note 8, at 31; See text
accompanying note 8 supra.
12 Torpey, supra note 8, at 12.
13 Downey, supra note 8, at 43-44; Moehlman, The Wall of Separation Between
Church and State 78 (1951) [hereinafter
cited as Moehlman]; See generally Torpey,
supra note 8, at 15-17 and Stokes, supra
note 5, at 81, both citing the compilations
of Sanford Cobb as to religious qualifications for Colonial citizenship and officeholders.
14 Reprinted in WaIz v. Tax Commission,
397 U.S. 664, 719-27 (1970) (Douglas, J.,
dissenting, app. II) and in Everson v.
Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1, 63-72
(1947) (Rutledge, J., dissenting, app.).
15 Antieau, supra note 9, at 100-19.
16[d., Moehlman, supra note 13, at 75-84;
Torpey, supra note 8, at 15-17; Stokes,
supra note 5, at 64-82.
17Levy, supra note 8, at 5-12; Stokes, supra
note 5, at 93-100.
18 E.g., Terrett v. Taylor, 13 U.S. (9 Cranch)
43 (1915); Permouli v. First Municipality,
44 U.S. (3 How.) 589 (1845).
19 As part of the "Civil War Amendments",
the Fourteenth Amendment was probably
never intended to address the religious
2

continued on page 28
Fall, rg84/The Law Forum-19

Defending the Mentally III
54

55

56
51
58

0xeculive
ehalionery

59

9roducls

"EVERYTHING FOR THE
NEW LAW OFFICE"

60

61
62

63
64
65

LETTERHEADS
LEGAL PAPER

66

67

68

ATTORNEY TIME
CONTROL SYSTEMS

69

10
11
72

COMPLETE ATTORNEY
CHECKS AND
BOOKKEEPING SYSTEMS

13
14
15

16
11

WORD PROCESSING
SUPPLIES
RIBBONS AND DISKETTES

78

19
80

81

LEGAL FORMS AND
RED FI LE POCKETS

82

83
84
85
86
87

WE CAN ALSO FILL ALL YOUR
OFFICE SUPPLY NEEDS WITH A
COMPLETE LINE OF ALL THE
BASIC ITEMS

88
89
90

91

92
93
94

320 East 25% Street
Baltimore, Maryland 21218

95

(301) 467-6177
96

28-The Law Forum/Fall, 1984

continued from page 23
Morris v. State, II Md. App. 18, 272 A.2d
663 (1971).
284 Md. 588, 399 A.2d 578 (1979), cert.
denied, 450 U.S. 960 (1981).
Id., 284 Md. at 593-594, 399 A.2d at 581-82.
Id., 284 Md. at 594, 399 A.2d at 582.
For a thorough discussion, see Singer,
The Imposition of the Insanity Defense on
an Unwilling Defendant, 41 OHIO ST. L.].
637 (1980).
United States v. Robertson, 430 F. Supp
444,446-47 (D.D.C. 1977); Whalem v. United States, 346 F.2d 812, 818 (D.C. Cir.
1965), cat. denied, 382 U.S. 862 (1965).
See ABA STANDARDS, Standards 5.1, 5.2;
accord, Frendak v. United States, 408 A.2d
364,376-79 (D.C.Ct.App. 1979).
369 U.S. 705 (1962).
D.C. CODE ANN. 24-301(d) (1959).
Lynch v. Overholser, 369 U.S. at 719.
Id. 369 U.S. at 71!.
18 Md. App. 578, 308 A.2d 455 (1973); vacated as moot, 271 Md. 367,316 A.2d 824
(1974).
Id., 18Md. App. at 586-587,308A.2dat460.
Id., 18 Md. App. at 585, 308 A.2d at 459;
Whitey. State, 17 Md. App. at61-62, 299A.
2d at 875.
List v. State, 271 Md. 367, 316 A.2d 824
(1974).
White v. State, 17 Md. App. at 58, 299 A.2d
at 873.
Id.
Md. R. 4-242(f).
Walker v. State, 21 Md. App. 666, 671, 321
A.2d 170, 174 (1974).
Id.
Riggleman v. State, 33 Md. App. 344,363
A.2d 1159, (1976).
MD. [HEALTH GEN.] CODE ANN. §1O-615
(1982).
Id. at §1O-622.
441 U.S. 418 (1979).
Id. at 433; see Dorsey v. Solomon, 604 F.2d
271,276-77 (4th Cir. 1979)(applying Addington to Maryland's criminal commitment system); see also Coard v. State, 288
Md. 523, 419 A.2d 383, (1980).
MD. [HEALTH GEN.] CODE ANN. §12-1I1
(1984).
_
U.S. ~ 103 S.Ct. 3043 (1983).
Id., _ U.S. ~ 103 S.Ct. 305!.
MD. [HEALTH GEN.] CODE ANN. §12-III(a)
(1984).
Id. at §12-114(a).
Id. at §12-118(a).
See id. at §§12-113(b),(c).
Id. at §12-113(d).
Jones v. United States, _U.S. at~ 103
S.Ct. at 3052.
See ABA STANDARDS, Standard 4-5.2(a)(i).
See id. at Standard 4-5.2(b).
For a thorough discussion, see Chernoff &
Schaeffer, Defending the Mentally Ill:
Ethical Quicksand, 10 AM. CRIM. L. REV.
505 (1972).
MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY Canon 7 (1979).
Id. at Canon 4.
See n.89, supra; see also ABA STANDARDS,
Standards 1-1.1-8.6.
See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC6-4, EC7-6, DR6-101(3)
(1979); see also ABA STANDARDS, Standards 4-1.1-8.6
See e.g., People v. Gonzalez, 20 N.Y.2d 289,
294,282 N.Y.S. 538, 542:229 N.E.2d 220,
223 (J967); see also List v. State, 18 Md.
App. at 586-87, 308 A.2d at 459-60.
18 Md. App. 578, 308 A.2d 455 (1973), vacated as moot, 271 Md. 367,316 A.2d 824
(1974).

91 _
98 _

U.S.
U.S.

~
~

104 S.Ct. 2039 (1984).
104 S.Ct. 2052 (1984).

99 Id.
100Id. at 2065.

ABA STANDARDS, supra.
Strickland v. Washington, _ U.S. ~
104 S.Ct. 2065 (1984).
103 ABA STANDARDS, Standard 4-5.2(a)(i).
104 See United States v. Cronic, _ U.S. ~
104 S.Ct. 2039 (1984); see also Strickland v.
Washington, _U.S. ~ 104 S.Ct. 2052
(1984).
105 Kennedy v. Maggio, 34 Crim. L. Rptr.
2430 (5th Cir. February 21, 1984).
106 Strickland v. Washington, 104 S.Ct. at
2068.
101 See MD. [HEALTH GEN.] CODE ANN. §12108 (1984).
108 See generally, id. at §§12-108-2!.
109 See id. at §12-113; see also Jones v. United
States, _ U.S. at ~ 103 S.Ct. 3052.
110 MD. [HEALTH GEN.] CODE ANN. §§12-101120 (1984).
III Id. at §12-109(b), §12-113(d).
112 Jones v. United States, _U.S. at~ 103
S.Ct.3052.
113 Pouncey v. State, 297 Md. 269, 465 A.2d
478; Langworthy v. State, 284 Md. at 599
n.12, 399 A.2d 584.
114 MD. [HEALTH GEN.] CODE ANN. §12-113(b),
(c) (1984).

101

102

Religion on Trial
continued from page 19
rights of any persons except former slaves
See Nowak, supra note 5 at 540-48.
20 98 U.S. 145 (1878).
21Id. at 164.
22Id. at 164, 166.
23Id. at 164-66.
24 For an analysis of the further refinement
of Supreme Court standards in this area
see Nowak, supra note 5, at 849-94.
25 310 U.S. 296 (1940).
26 For an analysis of the application of free
speech concepts by analogy to many of the
early religion cases, see Nowak, supra note
5, at 728-40, 809, 849. 873-74.
21 Malnak v. Yogi, 440 F. Supp. 1284 (D.
N.]. 1977) (Transcendental Meditation).
28 E.g., Turner v. Unif. Church, 473 F. Supp.
367 (D.R.1. 1978), afl'd, 602 F.2d, 458
(1979); Van Schaick v. Church of Scientology, 535 F. Supp. 1125 (D. Mass. 1982).
29 Cj. PeoJ\le v. Patrick, 126 Cal. App. 3d at
960-61, 179 Cal. Rptr. at 282 (consent and
prejudice issues raised but not reached).
30 For example, see the nisi opinion in
Turner v. Unif. Church, 473 F. Supp. 367
(D.R.1. 1978). See also Unif. Church v.
Rosenfeld, 458 N.Y.S.2d 920 (App. Div.
1983)(church's deceit justifying denial of
special use permit).
31 See, supra note I.
32 See text accompanying notes 20 et seq.
33 An estoppel based upon a reasonable
belief that consent was valid could also be
argued. See text accompanying notes 3646 infra; contra, RESTATEMENT OF TORTS §
61 (1934)(invalid consent of "invalid
personality" ).
34 Technically, the defense would be valid
only as against the victim which would
arguably privilege the religious society to
engage in the activities upon which third
party claims such as those of the parents in
George were based.
35 See, supra note I; Cf. Note, Role of the
Child's Wishes in Custody Proceedings, 6
U.c. DAVIS L. REV. 332, 337 (l973)(fourteen years old as a reference age).
36 See, Note, A bduction, Religious Sects and
the Free Exercise Guarantee, 25 SYRACUSE

L. REV. 623, 637-39 (1974).
[d.
38 For an analysis of cases and circumstances
regarding emancipation due to acts of the
minor see Annat., 32 A.L.R. 3d 1055
(1970).
39 E.g., Martinez v. So. Pae. Co., 45 Cal. 2d
244, 288 P. 2d 868 (1955); Shoaf v. Shoaf,
282 N.C. 287, 192 S.E. 2d 299 (1972).
40 Slaterv. Cal. St. Auto. Assn., 200 Cal. App.
2d 375, 19 Cal. Rptr. 290 (l962)(intent of
parents to renunciate rights to child's car).
41 J oliceur v. Mihaly, 5 Cal. 3d 565, 488 P. 2d
\, 96 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1971) (separate
residence); See, supra note 38.
42 CAL. CIV. CODE § 244 (West).
43 See, supra note 100.
41 See, supra note 1.
45 See, e.g., supra notes 33-42.
46 See, Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 241
(1972).
47 [d. at 113.
48 [d. at 136.
49 [d. at 63-66, 108-36,210-11.
50 322 U.S. 78, 64 S.Ct. 882, 88 L. Ed. 1148
(1944).
51 [d. at 28; Query: how elastic is society's
moral fabric vis-a-vis religion?
52 See, supra note I.
53 See, supra note I.
54 People v. Sipelt, 234 Cal. App. 2d 862, 44
Cal. Rptr. 846 (1965), cert. den'd, 384 U.S.
1015 (1965); People v. Hernon, 106 Cal.
App. 2d 638, 235 P. 2d 614 (1951); City of
Newport Beach v. Sasse, 9 Cal. App. 3d
803, 88 Cal. Rptr. 476 (1970).
55 CAL. PEN. CODE § 236 (West); City of
N ewpt. Beach v. Sasse, 9 Cal. App. 3d 803,
88 Cal. Rptr. 476 (1970).
56 See text accompanying notes 33-34 supra.
57 See text accompanying notes 33-52 supra.
58 See, Stokes, supra note 5, at 4.
59 But see, supra note 29.
GOPeople v. Buscemi, 391 N.Y.S. 2d 343,
(Civ. Ct. N.Y. 1977).
61 See, supra note 54.
62 Leggett v. DiGiorgio Corp., 276 Cal. App.
2d 306, 80 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1969); See also
text accompanying notes 83-89 infra.
63 Girard v. Ball, 125 Cal. App. 3d 772, 178
Cal. Rptr. 406 (1981).
64 [d.; Ricard v. Pac. Indem. Co., 132 Cal.
App. 3d 886, 183 Cal. Rptr. 502 (1982).
Query: whether a standard of distress
based upon "civilized society" is really an
objective one?
65 Merlov. Std. Life & Ace. Ins. Co., 59 Cal.
App. 3d 5, 130 Cal. Rptr. 416 (1976); See
generally, Wercheck, Unmeasurable Damages and a Yardstick, 17 HASTINGS L.J.
263 (1965).
66 It is highly likely that this relatively large
award to Miss George and her mother is a
jury attempt to compensate for the limited
award made by virture of Mr. George's
wrongful death due to which the mother
also suffered but for which she could not
recover. See text accompanying notes 6874 infra.
67 See, supra note I.
68 See, Taylor v. Gilmartin, 686 F. 2d 1346
(10th Cir. 1982) (Claims of discrimination
by alternative religions entitled to strict
scrutiny).
69 See text accompanying notes 50-62 supra;
Cj. Davidson v. City of Westminster, 32
Cal. 3d 197,649 P.3d 894, 185 Cal. Rptr.
252 (1982)(no malicious intent to injure by
defendant police who were surveilling
plaintiff's assailants but failed to act to
prevent same).
70 See McClelland & Truett, Survival of
Punitive Damages in Wrongful Death
Cases, 8 U.S.F. L. REV. 585 (1974).
37

See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 377 (West).
See text accompanying note 65 supra.
73 See, supra note I.
74 Cal. Prob. Code § 573 (West); Grimshaw v.
Ford Mtr. Co., 119 Cal. App. 3d 757, 174
Cal. Rptr. 348 (1981); see, supra note 70.
75 See text accompanying notes 44-62, 56-62
supra.
76 See generally, Prosser, TORTS §§ 902-3 (4th
Ed. 1971).
77 See CAL. CIV. CODE § 45 (West).
78 See supra. note I.
79 See text accompanying notes 57-62 subra.
80 See, e.g., Lovell v. Griffin, 303 U.S. 814
(1938); Cantwell v. Conn., 310 U.S. 296
(1940); Martin v. City of Struthers, 319
U.S. 141 (1943); Cj. Chaplinsky v. New
Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942) (cursing
held not related to religious exercise).
81 See, supra note I.
82 See text accompanymg notes 68-74 supra
and notes 83-89 infra.
83 See, supra note 1.
84 [d. (prior record award against Synanon).
85 See e.g., Sniadach v. Fam. Fin. Corp., 395
U.S. 337 (1969) (due process); Shelley v.
Kraemer, 334 U.S. I (1948) (equal pro tec71

72

tion); Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249
(1953) (equal protection).
86 Liodas v. Sahadi, 19 Cal. 3d 278,562 P.2d
316, 137 Cal. Rptr. 635 (1977); Hasson v.
Ford Mtr. Co., 32 Cal.3d 388, 650 P.2d
1171, 185 Cal. Rptr. 654 (1982).
87 Id.; cj. Werchick, Unmeasurable Damages,
supra note 65 with Note, Analysis of Egan
v. Mutual of Omaha, 13 U. CALIF. tax laws
re: punitive damages.
88 Grimshaw v. F.M.C., 119 Cal. App. 3d
757, 174 Cal. Rptr. 348 (1981).
89 See Rosener v. Sears Roeb. & Co., 110 Cal.
App. 3d 740, 168 Cal. Rptr. 237 (1980),
appeal dismissed, 450 U.S. 1051 (1980). See
also note 82 supra.

Current Relevancy
continued {rom page 3 I

R NEELY, How COURTS GOVERN AMERICA
18 (1981).
22 Quilici v. Morton Grove, 695 F.2d 261,270
n. 8 (7th Cir. 1982).
23 State v. Kessler, 289 Or. 359, __ , 614 P.2d
94,95 (1980).
21

SAVE-A..HEART FOUNDATION, INC.
S.A.H.'s Lifesaving Coronary Projects
Sinai Hospital
Save-A-Heart's initial goal was to establish a much
needed catheterization lab at Sinai Hospital where this
service could be made readily available to heart patients in the community. In 1977, the Foundation's
dream became reality with the dedication of its
$750,000 Cardiac Catheterization Center at Sinai.
Equipped with the latest diagnostic tools and equipment, it is one of the finest in the country. With this
accomplished, Save-A-Heart, while continually adding
new equipment to the Center, went on to establish other
vital coronary projects throughout Metropolitan
Baltimore.

monitoring equipment, as well as other heartsaving
devices, not only to the coronary wing, but to the
hospital's Emergency Room. There is always a need for
additional furnishings and equipment in the SAH
Wing at Baltimore County General.

Pikesville Volunteer Fire Company

Two emergency Telemetry ambulances have been
donated by the Save-A-Heart Foundation, in conjunction with the Covenant Guild, at a combined cost of
over $100,000. The first, purchased in 1977, has since
been replaced by a more advanced model, which has
been on the streets since 1983. Also, for the new ambulance, the Foundation purchased a Thumper, which
North Charles General Hospital
is a mechanical CPR device and other equipment. On
Save-A-Heart's $100,000 gift to the newly expanded the rescue scene in Pikesville and surrounding areas,
20-bed coronary care and intensive care units at North look for the new SAH ambulance.
Charles General Hospital provided the newest, most
modern telemetry and monitoring equipment. Con- Liberty Road Volunteer Fire Company
stant bedside surveillance, via this vital equipment, On February 4, 1984, Save-A-Heart Foundation
makes it possible to help save many hearts at North joined the Liberty Road Volunteer Fire Company in
Charles General Hospital. While the expanding ICU! dedicating the company's brand new 1984SAH Road
CCU was dedicated in 1982, Save-A-Heart continues Rescue Ambulance. Made possible through Save-Aits work on behalf of the hospital's coronary needs. Heart's contribution of $33,000, the Foundation was
its major benefactor. Advanced life support systems,
Provident Hospital
direct hospital telemetry and other vital systems and
Recently, Save-A-Heart presented its latest "heart- equipment make this vehicle a (flifesaver" throughout
saver" to Provident Hospital; a $25,000 Echocardio- the Liberty Road Corridor.
graph Machine. Taking the echo image in two dimensions, this piece of equipment not only permits a more
precise cardiac diagnosis, but it increases the number

of disease entities that can be diagnosed by echocardiograms. A vital force in the fight against heart disease at Provident Hospital.

Baltimore County General Hospital
Save-A-Heart's 40-bed $875,000 Coronary Intensive
Care and Progressive Care Wing at Baltimore County
General Hospital, the largest project the Foundation
has ever undertaken, was completed in 1978. In addition to building and furnishing patient rooms in this
area, Save-A-Heart has contributed telemetry and

And Our Newest 1984 Projects
$300,000
Pledge to Franklin Square Hospital
Coronary Unit
$100,000
Pledge to the Save-A-Heart
Dr. Israel S. Zinberg Fund
For The Prevention of Sudden Cardiac
Death at Sinai Hospital
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